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Abstract
We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic
justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t:F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles
originating from both mainstream epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It contributes to the studies of the well-known Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. We state
a general Correspondence Theorem showing that behind each epistemic modal logic, there is
a robust system of justifications. This renders a new, evidence-based foundation for epistemic
logic.
As a case study, we offer a resolution of the Goldman-Kripke ‘Red Barn’ paradox and analyze
Russell’s ‘prime minister example’ in Justification Logic. Furthermore, we formalize the wellknown Gettier example and reveal hidden assumptions and redundancies in Gettier’s reasoning.
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Introduction

The celebrated account of Knowledge as Justified True Belief commonly attributed to Plato (cf. [29;
34]) was widely accepted until 1963 when a paper by Edmund Gettier [29] opened the door to a
broad philosophical discussion of the subject (cf. [19; 32; 45; 53; 62] and many others).
Meanwhile, commencing from seminal works [37; 67], the notions of Knowledge and Belief have
acquired formalization by means of modal logic with atoms KF (F is known) and BF (F is believed).
Within this approach, the following analysis was adopted: for a given agent,
F is known

∼

F holds in all epistemically possible situations.

∗

(1)

This work has been supported by NSF grant 0830450, CUNY Collaborative Incentive Research Grant CIRG1424,
and PSC CUNY Research Grant PSCREG-39-721

1

The resulting Epistemic Logic has been remarkably successful in terms of developing a rich mathematical theory and applications (cf. [23; 48], and other sources). However, the notion of justification, which has been an essential component of epistemic studies, was conspicuously absent in the
mathematical models of knowledge within the epistemic logic framework. This deficiency is displayed most prominently, in the Logical Omniscience defect of the modal logic of knowledge (cf. [21;
22; 38; 51; 56]). In the provability domain, the absence of an adequate description of the logic of
justifications (here mathematical proofs) remained an impediment to both formalizing the BrouwerHeyting-Kolmogorov semantics of proofs and providing a long-anticipated exact provability semantics for Gödel’s provability logic S4 and intuitionistic logic ([3; 4; 6; 66]). This lack of a justification
component has, perhaps, contributed to a certain gap between epistemic logic and mainstream
epistemology ([34; 35]). We would like to think that Justification Logic is a step towards filling this
void.
The contribution of this paper to epistemology can be briefly summarized as follows.
We describe basic logical principles for justifications and relate them to both mainstream and formal epistemology. The result is a long-anticipated mathematical notion
of justification, making epistemic logic more expressive. We now have the capacity to
reason about justifications, simple and compound. We can compare different pieces of
evidence pertaining to the same fact. We can measure the complexity of justifications,
which leads to a coherent theory of logical omniscience. Justification Logic provides a
novel, evidence-based mechanism of truth-tracking which seems to be a key ingredient of
the analysis of knowledge. Finally, Justification Logic furnishes a new, evidence-based
foundation for the logic of knowledge, according to which
F is known

∼

F has an adequate justification.

(2)

There are several natural interpretations of Justification Logic. Justification assertions of the
format t:F read generically as
t is a justification of F.
(3)
There is also a more strict ‘justificationist’ reading in which t:F is understood as
t is accepted by agent as a justification of F.

(4)

The language and tools of Justification Logic accommodate both readings of t : F . Moreover,
Justification Logic is general enough to incorporate other semantics that are not necessarily terminologically related to justifications or proofs. For example, t:F can be read as
t is a sufficient resource for F.

(5)

Tudor Protopopescu suggests that t:F could also be assigned an externalist, non-justificationist
reading, something like
F satisfies conditions t.
(6)
In this setting, t would be something like a set of causes or counterfactuals. Such a reading would
still maintain the distinction between partial and factive justifications, since t may not be all that
is required for belief that F to count as knowledge that F.
2

Within Justification Logic, we do not directly analyze what it means for t to justify F beyond
the format t:F , but rather attempt to characterize this relation axiomatically. This is similar to
the way Boolean logic treats its connectives, say, disjunction: it does not analyze the formula p ∨ q
but rather assumes certain logical axioms and truth tables about this formula.
There are several design decisions made for this installment of Justification Logic.
1. We decide to limit our attention, at this stage, to propositional and quantifier-free systems
of Justification Logic, and leave quantified systems for further study.
2. We build our systems on the simplest base: classical Boolean logic, though we are completely
aware that there are much more elaborate logical models, e.g., intuitionistic and substructural logics,
conditionals, relevance logics, and logics of counterfactual reasoning, just to name a few. There are
several good reasons for choosing the Boolean logic base here. At this stage, we are concerned first
with justifications, which provide a sufficiently serious challenge on even the simplest Boolean base.
Once this case is sorted out in a satisfactory way, we can move on to incorporating justifications
into other logics. Second, the paradigmatic examples which we will consider (e.g., Goldman-Kripke
and Gettier), can be handled with Boolean Justification Logic. Third, the core of Epistemic Logic
consists of modal systems with a classical Boolean base (K, T, K4, S4, K45, KD45, S5, etc.). We
provide each of them with a corresponding Justification Logic companion based on Boolean logic.
3. Within the Justification Logic framework, we treat both partial and factive justifications.
This helps to capture the essence of discussion on these matters in epistemology, where justifications
are not generally assumed to be factive.
4. In this paper, we consider the case of one agent only, although several multi-agent Justification
Logic systems have already been developed ([5; 12; 68]).
Formal logical methods do not directly solve philosophical problems, but rather provide a tool
for analyzing assumptions and to ensure that we draw correct conclusions. Our hope is that
Justification Logic will do just that.
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Preliminary Analysis of Principles Involved

In this section, we will survey the Logic of Proofs, Gettier’s examples [29], and examine some
classical post-Gettier sources to determine what logical principles in the given Justification Logic
format (propositional Boolean logic with justification assertions t : F ) may be extracted. As is
usual with converting informally stated principles into formal ones, a certain amount of good
will is required. This does not at all mean that the considerations adduced in [19; 32; 45; 53;
62] may be readily formulated in the Boolean Justification Logic. The aforementioned papers are
written in natural language, which is richer than any formal one; a more sophisticated formal
language could probably provide a better account here, which we leave to future studies.

2.1

The Logic of Proofs

The Logic of Proofs LP was suggested by Gödel in [31] and developed in full in [2; 4]. LP gives a
complete axiomatization of the notion of mathematical proof with natural operations ‘application,’
‘sum,’ and ‘proof checker.’ We discuss these operations below in a more general epistemic setting.
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In LP, justifications are represented by proof polynomials, which are terms built from proof
variables x, y, z, . . . and proof constants a, b, c, . . . by means of two binary operations: application ‘·’
and sum (union, choice) ‘+,’ and one unary operation proof checker ‘!’. The formulas of LP are
those of propositional classical logic augmented by the formation rule: if t is a proof polynomial
and F a formula, then t:F is again a formula.
The Logic of Proofs LP contains the postulates of classical propositional logic and the rule of
Modus Ponens along with
s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s·t):G)
s:F → (s+t):F , t:F → (s+t):F
t:F → !t:(t:F )
t:F → F

(Application)
(Sum)
(Proof Checker )
(Reflection).

Proof constants in LP represent ‘atomic’ proofs of axioms which are not analyzed any further. In
addition to the usual logical properties, such as being closed under substitution and respecting the
Deduction Theorem, LP enjoys the Internalization property:
If ` F , then there is a proof polynomial p such that ` p:F .

2.2

Gettier Examples

Gettier in [29] described two situations, Case I and Case II, that were supposed to provide examples
of justified true beliefs which should not be considered knowledge. In this paper we will focus on
formalizing Case I, which proved to be more challenging. Case II can be easily formalized in a
similar fashion.
Here is a shortened exposition of Case I from [29].
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong
evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
Proposition (d) entails:
(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of
(d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is
true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And,
also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Then, all of the following are true:
1) (e) is true,
2) Smith believes that (e) is true, and
3) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true.
But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true. . ..
Gettier uses a version of the epistemic closure principle, closure of justification under logical
consequence:
. . . if Smith is justified in believing P, . . . and Smith deduces Q from P . . ., then Smith
is justified in believing Q.
4

Here is its natural formalization:
Smith is justified in believing P can be formalized as “for some t, t:P ”;
Smith deduces Q from P — “there is a deduction of P → Q (available to Smith)”;
Smith is justified in believing Q — “t:Q for some t.”
Such a rule holds for the Logic of Proofs, as well as for all other Justification Logic systems
considered in this paper. It is a combination of the Internalization Rule:
if ` F , then ` s:F for some s

(7)

s:(P → Q) → (t:P → (s·t):Q).

(8)

and the Application Axiom:
Indeed, suppose t:P and there is a deduction of P → Q. By the Internalization Rule, s:(P → Q) for
some s. From the Application Axiom, by Modus Ponens twice, we get (s·t):Q.

2.3

Goldman’s Reliabilism

Goldman in [32] offered the ‘fourth condition’ to be added to the Justified True Belief definition of
knowledge. According to [32],
a subject’s belief is justified only if the truth of a belief has caused the subject to have
that belief (in the appropriate way), and for a justified true belief to count as knowledge,
the subject must also be able to correctly reconstruct (mentally) that causal chain.
Goldman’s principle makes it clear that a justified belief (in our language, a situation t justifies
F for some t) for an agent occurs only if F is true, which provides the Factivity Axiom for
‘knowledge-producing’ justifications
t:F → F

(Factivity Axiom).

(9)

The Factivity Axiom is assumed for factive justifications (systems JT, LP, JT45 below) but not for
general justification systems J, J4, J45, JD45.
With a certain amount of good will, we can assume that the ‘causal chain’ leading from the
truth of F to a justified belief that F manifests itself in the Principle of Internalization which holds
for many Justification Logic systems:
If F is valid, then one could construct a justification p such that p:F is valid.

(10)

Internalization is usually represented in an equivalent form (in the presence of the Completeness
Theorem) as a meta-rule (7). The algorithm which builds a justified belief p : F from a strong
evidence (proof) of the validity of F seems to be an instance of Goldman’s ‘causal chain.’
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2.4

Lehrer and Paxson’s Indefeasibility Condition

Lehrer and Paxson in [45] offered the following ‘indefeasibility condition’:
there is no further truth which, had the subject known it, would have defeated [subject’s]
present justification for the belief.
The ‘further truth’ here could refer to a possible update of the subject’s database, or some possibleworlds situation, etc.: these readings lie outside the scope of our language of Boolean Justification
Logic. A natural reading of ‘further truth’ in our setting could be ‘other postulate or assumption of
the system,’ which means a simple consistency property which vacuously holds for all Justification
Logic systems considered here. Another plausible reading of ‘further truth’ could be ‘further evidence,’ and we assume this particular reading here. Since there is no temporal or update component
in our language yet, ‘any further evidence’ could be understood for now as ‘any other justification,’
or just ‘any justification.’
Furthermore, Lehrer and Paxson’s condition seems to involve a negation of an existential quantifier over justifications ‘there is no further truth . . . ,’ or
there is no justification. . ..
However, within the classical logic tradition, we can read this as a universal quantifier over justifications followed by a negation
for any further evidence, it is not the case. . ..
Denoting ‘present justification for the belief’ as the assertion s:F , we reformulate Lehrer–Paxson’s
condition as
given s:F , for any evidence t, it is not the case that t would have defeated s:F .
The next step is to formalize ‘t does not defeat s:F .’ This informal statement seems to suggest an
implication
if s:F holds, then the joint evidence of s and t, which we denote here as s + t, is also
an evidence for F , i.e., (s + t):F holds.
Here is the resulting formal version of Lehrer–Paxson’s condition: for any proposition F and any
justifications s and t, the following holds
s:F → (s + t):F

2.5

(Monotonicity Axiom).

(11)

Further Assumptions

In order to build a formal account of justification, we will make some basic structural assumptions:
justifications are abstract objects which have structure, operations on justifications are potentially
executable, agents do not lose or forget justifications, agents apply the laws of classical logic and
accept their conclusions, etc.
In the following, we consider both: justifications, which do not necessarily yield the truth of
a belief, and factive justifications, which yield the truth of the belief.
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3
3.1

Basic Principles and Systems
Application

The Application operation takes justifications s and t and produces a justification s · t such that if
s:(F → G) and t:F , then (s·t):G. Symbolically,
s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s·t):G).

(12)

This is a basic property of justifications assumed in combinatory logic and λ-calculi (cf. [64]),
BHK-semantics ([65]), Kleene realizability ([39]), the Logic of Proofs LP ([4]), etc. Application
Principle (12) is related to the epistemological closure principle (cf., for example, [20; 46]) that one
knows everything that one knows to be implied by what one knows. However, (12) does not rely
on this closure principle, since (12) deals with a broader spectrum of justifications, not necessarily
linked to knowledge.
Note that the epistemological closure principle which could be formalized using the knowledge
modality K as
K(F → G) → (KF → KG),
(13)
smuggles the logical omniscience defect into modal epistemic logic. The latter does not have the
capacity to measure how hard it is to attain knowledge [21; 22; 38; 51; 56]. Justification Logic
provides natural means of escaping logical omniscience by keeping track of the size of justification
terms [10].

3.2

Monotonicity of Justification

The Monotonicity property of justification has been expressed by the operation sum ‘+,’ which can
be read from (11). If s:F , then whichever evidence t occurs, the combined evidence s + t remains
a justification for F . Operation ‘+’ takes justifications s and t and produces s + t, which is a
justification for everything justified by s or by t.
s:F → (s + t):F

and

s:F → (t + s):F.

A similar operation ‘+’ is present in the Logic of Proofs LP, where the sum ‘s+t’ can be interpreted
as a concatenation of proofs s and t.
Correspondence Theorem 7 uses Monotonicity to connect Justification Logic with epistemic
modal logic. However, it is an intriguing challenge to develop a theory of non-monotonic justifications which prompt belief revision. Some Justification Logic systems without Monotonicity have
been studied in [13; 41; 42].

3.3

Basic Justification Logic J0

Justification terms (polynomials) are built from justification variables x, y, z, . . . and justification
constants a, b, c, . . . (with indices i = 1, 2, 3 . . . which we will be omitting whenever it is safe) by
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means of the operations application ‘·’ and sum ‘+’1 . Constants denote atomic justifications
which the system no longer analyzes; variables denote unspecified justifications.
Basic Logic of Justifications J0 :
A1. Classical propositional axioms and rule Modus Ponens,
A2. Application Axiom s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s · t):G),
A3. Monotonicity Axiom s:F → (s + t):F , s:F → (t + s):F ,
J0 is the logic of general (not necessarily factive) justifications for an absolutely skeptical agent
for whom no formula is provably justified, i.e., J0 does not derive t:F for any t and F . Such an
agent is, however, capable of making relative justification conclusions of the form
if x:A, y:B, . . . , z:C hold, then t:F .
J0 is able, with this capacity, to adequately emulate other Justification Logic systems in its language.

3.4

Logical Awareness and Constant Specifications

The Logical Awareness principle states that logical axioms are justified ex officio: an agent accepts logical axioms (including the ones concerning justifications) as justified. As stated here,
Logical Awareness is too restrictive and Justification Logic offers a flexible mechanism of Constant
Specifications to represent all shades of logical awareness.
Justification Logic distinguishes between an assumption and a justified assumption. Constants
are used to denote justifications of assumptions in situations when we don’t analyze these justifications any further. Suppose we want to postulate that an axiom A is justified for a given agent.
The way to say it in Justification Logic is to postulate
e1:A
for some evidence constant e1 with index 1. Furthermore, if we want to postulate that this new
principle e1:A is also justified, we can postulate
e2:(e1:A)
for the similar constant e2 with index 2, etc. Keeping track of indices is not necessary, but it is
easy and helps in decision procedures (cf. [44]). The set of all assumptions of this kind for a given
logic is called a Constant Specification. Here is a formal definition.
A Constant Specification CS for a given logic L is a set of formulas
en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A (n ≥ 1),
where A is an axiom of L, and e1 , e2 , . . . , en are similar constants with indices 1, 2, . . . , n. We also
assume that CS contains all intermediate specifications, i.e., whenever en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A is in CS,
then en−1 : . . . : e1 : A is in CS too. In this paper, we will distinguish the following types of constant
specifications:
1

More elaborate models considered below in this paper also use additional operations on justifications, e.g., verifier
‘!’ and negative verifier ‘?’.
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• empty: CS = ∅. This corresponds to an absolutely skeptical agent (cf. a comment after
axioms of J0 ).
• finite: CS is a finite set of formulas. This is a representative case, since any specific derivation
in Justification Logic concerns only finite sets of constants and constant specifications.
• axiomatically appropriate: for each axiom A there is a constant e1 such that e1 :A is in CS,
and if
en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A ∈ CS,
then
en+1 : en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A ∈ CS.
Axiomatically appropriate CS’s are necessary for ensuring the Internalization property.
• total: for each axiom A and any constants e1 , e2 , . . . , en ,
en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A ∈ CS.
We are reserving the name TCS for the total constant specification (for a given logic). Naturally, the total constant specification is axiomatically appropriate.
Logic of Justifications with given Constant Specification
JCS = J0 + CS.

Logic of Justifications
J = J0 + R4,
where R4 is the Axiom Internalization Rule:
For each axiom A and any constants e1 , e2 , . . . , en , infer en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A.
Note that J0 is J∅ , and J coincides with JTCS . The latter reflects the idea of the unrestricted Logical
Awareness for J. A similar principle appeared in the Logic of Proofs LP; it has also been anticipated
in Goldman’s [32]. Note that any specific derivation in J may be regarded as a derivation in JCS
for a corresponding finite constant specification CS, hence finite CS’s constitute an important
representative class of constant specifications.
Logical Awareness expressed by axiomatically appropriate constant specifications is an explicit
incarnation of the Necessitation Rule in modal epistemic logic:
`F

⇒

` KF

(14)

applied to axioms.
Let us consider some basic examples of derivations in J. In Examples 1 and 2, only constants
of level 1 have been used; in such situations we skip indices completely.
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Example 1 This example shows how to build a justification of a conjunction from justifications
of the conjuncts. In the traditional modal language, this principle is formalized as
2A ∧ 2B → 2(A ∧ B).
In J we express this idea in a more precise justification language.
1. A → (B → (A∧B)), a propositional axiom;
2. c:[A → (B → (A∧B))], from 1, by R4;
3. x:A → (c·x):(B → (A∧B)), from 2, by A2 and Modus Ponens;
4. x:A → (y:B → ((c·x)·y):(A∧B)), from 3, by A2 and some propositional reasoning;
5. x:A∧y:B → ((c·x)·y):(A∧B), from 5, by propositional reasoning.
The derived formula 5 contains constant c, which was introduced in line 2, and the complete reading
of the result of this derivation is
x:A∧y:B → ((c·x)·y):(A∧B), given c:[A → (B → (A∧B))].
Example 2 This example shows how to build a justification of a disjunction from justifications of
either of the disjuncts. In the usual modal language this is represented by
2A ∨ 2B → 2(A ∨ B).
Let us see how this would look in J.
1. A → (A∨B), by A1;
2. a:[A → (A∨B)], from 1, by R4;
3. x:A → (a·x):(A∨B), from 2, by A2 and Modus Ponens;
4. B → (A∨B), by A1;
5. b:[B → (A∨B)], from 4, by R4;
6. y:B → (b·y):(A∨B) from 5, by A2 and Modus Ponens;
7. (a·x):(A∨B) → (a·x+b·y):(A∨B), by A3;
8. (b·y):(A∨B) → (a·x+b·y):(A∨B), by A3;
9. (x:A∨y:B) → (a·x+b·y):(A∨B) from 3, 6, 7, 8, by propositional reasoning.
The complete reading of the result of this derivation is
(x:A∨y:B) → (a·x+b·y):(A∨B), given a:[A → (A∨B)] and b:[B → (A∨B)].
Explicit mention of Constant Specifications of Justification Logic systems is normally used when
semantic issues are concerned: e.g., arithmetical, symbolic, and epistemic semantics. To define the
truth value of a formula under a given interpretation, one should be given a specification of constants
involved.
For each constant specification CS, JCS enjoys the Deduction Theorem, because J0 contains
propositional axioms and Modus Ponens as the only rule of inference.
Theorem 1 For each axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS, JCS enjoys Internalization:
If ` F , then ` p:F for some justification term p.
10

Proof. Induction on derivation length. Suppose ` F . If F is an axiom, then, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant e suchb that e:F is in CS, hence an axiom of JCS . If F is in
CS, then, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, e:F is in CS for some constant e. If F is obtained
by Modus Ponens from X → F and X, then, by the Induction Hypothesis, ` s:(X → F ) and ` t:X
for some s, t. By the Application Axiom, ` (s·t):F . Note that Internalization can require a growth
of constant specification sets; if ` F with a Constant Specification CS, then the proof of p:F may
need some Constant Specification CS 0 which is different from CS.
2

4

Red Barn Example and Tracking Justifications

We begin illustrating new capabilities of Justification Logic with a paradigmatic Red Barn Example
which Kripke developed in 1980 in objection to Nozick’s account of knowledge (cf. article The
Epistemic Closure Principle in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [46], from which we borrow
the formulation, with some editing for brevity).
Suppose I am driving through a neighborhood in which, unbeknownst to me, papiermâché barns are scattered, and I see that the object in front of me is a barn. Because
I have barn-before-me percepts, I believe that the object in front of me is a barn. Our
intuitions suggest that I fail to know barn. But now suppose that the neighborhood
has no fake red barns, and I also notice that the object in front of me is red, so I know
a red barn is there. This juxtaposition, being a red barn, which I know, entails there
being a barn, which I do not, “is an embarrassment”2 .
We proceed in the spirit of the Red Barn Example and consider it a general test for theories that
explain knowledge. What we want is a way to represent what is going on here which maintains
epistemic closure,
one knows everything that one knows to be implied by what one knows,

(15)

but also preserves the problems the example was intended to illustrate.
We present plausible formal analysis of the Red Barn Example in epistemic modal logic (subsections 4.1 and 4.2) and in Justification Logic (subsections 4.3 and 4.4). We will see that epistemic
modal logic is capable only of telling us that there is a problem, whereas Justification Logic helps
to analyse what has gone wrong. We see that closure holds as it is supposed to, and we see that if
we keep track of justifications we can analyse why we had a problem.

4.1

Red Barn in modal logic of belief

In our first formalization, the logical derivation will be made in epistemic modal logic with ‘my
belief’ modality 2. We then interpret some of the occurrences of 2 as ‘knowledge’ according to the
problem’s description. We will not try to capture the whole scenario formally; to make our point,
it suffices to formalize and verify its “entailment” part. Let
2

Dretske [20].
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• B be ‘the object in front of me is a barn,’
• R be ‘the object in front of me is red,’
• 2 be ‘my belief’ modality.
The formulation considers observations ‘I see a barn’ and ‘I see a red barn,’ and claims logical
dependencies between them. The following is a natural formalization of these assumptions in the
epistemic modal logic of belief:
1. 2B, ‘I believe that the object in front of me is a barn’;
2. 2(B ∧R), ‘I believe that the object in front of me is a red barn.’
At the metalevel, we assume that 2 is knowledge, whereas 1 is not knowledge by the problem’s
description. So, we could add factivity of 2, 2(B∧R) → (B∧R), to the formal description, but this
would not matter for our conclusions. We note that indeed 1 logically follows from 2 in the modal
logic of belief K:
3. (B ∧R) → B, logical axiom;
4. 2[(B ∧R) → B], from 3, by Necessitation. As a logical truth, this is a case of knowledge too;
5. 2(B ∧R) → 2B, from 4, by modal logic.
Within this formalization, it appears that Closure Principle (15) is violated: 2(B∧R) is knowledge
by the problem’s description, 2[(B ∧R) → B] is knowledge as a simple logical axiom, whereas 2B
is not knowledge.

4.2

Red Barn in modal logic of knowledge

Now we will use epistemic modal logic with ‘my knowledge’ modality K. Here is a straightforward
formalization of Red Barn Example assumptions:
1. ¬KB, ‘I do not know that the object in front of me is a barn’;
2. K(B ∧R), ‘I know that the object in front of me is a red barn.’
It is easy to see that these assumptions are inconsistent in the modal logic of knowledge. Indeed,
3. K(B ∧R) → (KB ∧KR), by normal modal logic;
4. KB ∧KR, from 2 and 3, by Modus Ponens;
5. KB, from 4, by propositional logic.
Lines 1 and 5 formally contradict each other.
Modal logic of knowledge does not seem to apply here.

4.3

Red Barn in Justification Logic of belief

Justification Logic seems to provide a more fine-grained analysis of the Red Barn Example. We
naturally refine assumptions by introducing individual justifications u for belief that B, and v for
belief that B ∧R. The set of assumptions in the Justification Logic is
1. u:B, ‘u is the reason to believe that the object in front of me is a barn’;
12

2. v:(B ∧R), ‘v is the reason to believe that the object in front of me is a red barn.’ On the
metalevel, the description states that this is a case of knowledge, not merely a belief.
Again, we can add the factivity condition for 2, v:(B ∧R) → (B ∧R), but this does not change the
analysis here. Let us try to reconstruct the reasoning of the agent in J:
3. (B ∧R) → B, logical axiom;
4. a:[(B ∧R) → B], from 3, by Axiom Internalization. This is also knowledge, as before;
5. v:(B ∧R) → (a·v):B, from 4, by Application and Modus Ponens;
6. (a·v):B, from 2 and 5, by Modus Ponens.
Closure holds! Instead of deriving 1 from 2 as in Section 4.1, we have obtained a correct conclusion
that (a · v):B, i.e., ‘I know B for reason a · v,’ which seems to be different from u: the latter is
the result of a perceptual observation, whereas the former is the result of logical reasoning. In
particular, we cannot conclude that 2, v:(B ∧R), entails 1, u:B; moreover, with some basic model
theory of J in Section 5, we can show that 2 does not entail 1. Hence, after observing a red
façade, I indeed know B, but this knowledge does not come from 1, which remains a case of belief
rather than of knowledge.

4.4

Red Barn in Justification Logic of knowledge

Within this formalization, t:F is interpreted as
‘I know F for reason t.’
As in Section 4.2, we assume
1. ¬u:B, ‘u is not a sufficient reason to know that the object is a barn’;
2. v:(B ∧R), ‘v is a sufficient reason to know that the object is a red barn.’
This is a perfectly consistent set of assumptions in the logic of factive justifications
J + Factivity Principle (t:F → F ).
As in 4.3, we can derive (a·v):B where a:[(B ∧R) → B], but this does not lead to a contradiction.
Claims ¬u:B and (a·v):B naturally co-exist. They refer to different justifications u and a·v of the
same fact B; one of them insufficient and the other quite sufficient for my knowledge that B.
It appears that in 4.3 and 4.4, Justification Logic represents the structure of the argument
made by Kripke in his Red Barn Example, and which was not captured by traditional epistemic
modal tools. The Justification Logic formalization represents what seems to be happening in such
a case; we can maintain closure of knowledge under logical entailment, even though ‘barn’ is not
perceptually known.
The formal analyses provided in 4.3 and 4.4 is similar in spirit to a “conclusive reason” style of
analysis ([19]) which is formulated in terms of evidence tracking rather than belief tracking.
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5

Basic Epistemic Semantics

The standard epistemic semantics for J has been provided by the proper adaptation of KripkeFitting models [25] and Mkrtychev models [50].
A Kripke-Fitting J-model M = (W, R, E, ) is a Kripke model (W, R, ) enriched with an
admissible evidence function E such that E(t, F ) ⊆ W for any justification t and formula F .
Informally, E(t, F ) specifies the set of possible worlds where t is considered admissible evidence for
F . The intended use of E is in the truth definition for justification assertions:
u

t:F if and only if

1. F holds for all possible situations, i.e., v F for all v such that uRv;
2. t is an admissible evidence for F at u, i.e., u ∈ E(t, F ).
An admissible evidence function E must satisfy the closure conditions with respect to operations
‘·’ and ‘+’:
• Application: E(s, F → G) ∩ E(t, F ) ⊆ E(s·t, G). This condition states that whenever s is an
admissible evidence for F → G and t is an admissible evidence for F , their ‘product,’ s·t, is
an admissible evidence for G.
• Sum: E(s, F ) ∪ E(t, F ) ⊆ E(s + t, F ). This condition guarantees that s + t is an admissible
evidence for F whenever either s is admissible for F or t is admissible for F .
These are natural conditions to place on E because they are necessary for making basic axioms of
Application and Monotonicity valid.
We say that E(t, F ) holds at a given world u if u ∈ E(t, F ).
Given a model M = (W, R, E, ), the forcing relation
is extended from sentence variables to
all formulas as follows: for each u ∈ W ,
1.

respects Boolean connectives at each world (u F ∧ G iff u F and u G; u ¬F iff u 6 F ,
etc.);

2. u t:F iff u ∈ E(t, F ) and v F for every v ∈ W with uRv.
Note that an admissible evidence function E may be regarded as a Fagin-Halpern awareness function
[23] equipped with the structure of justifications.
A model M = (W, R, E, ) respects a Constant Specification CS at u ∈ W if u ∈ E(c, A) for all
formulas c:A from CS. Furthermore, M = (W, R, E, ) respects a Constant Specification CS if M
respects CS at each u ∈ W .
Theorem 2 For any Constant Specification CS, JCS is sound and complete for the class of all
Kripke-Fitting models respecting CS.
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Proof.
1. Fix a Constant Specification CS and consider JCS .
Soundness is straightforward. Induction on derivations in JCS . Let us check the axioms.
Application. Suppose u s:(F → G) and u t:F . Then, by the definition of forcing, u ∈ E(s, F →
G) and u ∈ E(t, F ), hence, by the closure condition for E, u ∈ E(s·t, G). Moreover, for each v such
that uRv, v F → G and v F , hence v G. Thus u (s·t):G and u s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s·t):G).
Sum. Suppose u t:F . Then u ∈ E(t, F ), hence, by the closure condition for E, u ∈ E(s+t, F ).
In addition, v F for each v such that uRv, hence u (s+t):F . Thus u t:F → (s+t):F .
Axioms from CS hold at each world, since the models respect CS. The Induction Step corresponds to the use of Modus Ponens, which is clearly a sound rule here.
To establish completeness, we use standard canonical model construction. The canonical model
M = (W, R, E, ) for JCS is defined as follows:
• W is the set of all maximal consistent sets in JCS . Following an established tradition, we
denote elements of W as Γ, ∆, etc.;
• ΓR∆ iff Γ] ⊆ ∆, where Γ] = {F | t:F ∈ Γ for some t};
• E(s, F ) = {Γ ∈ W | s:F ∈ Γ};
• Γ p iff p ∈ Γ.
The Truth Lemma claims that for all F ’s,
Γ F

if and only if F ∈ Γ.

This is established by standard induction on the complexity of F . The atomic cases are covered by
the definition of ‘ .’ The Boolean induction steps are standard. Consider the case when F is t:G
for some t and G.
If t:G ∈ Γ, then G ∈ ∆ for all ∆ such that ΓR∆ by the definition of R. By the Induction
Hypothesis, ∆ G. In addition, Γ ∈ E(t, G) by the definition of E. Hence Γ t:G, i.e., Γ F .
If t:G 6∈ Γ, then Γ 6∈ E(t, G), i.e., Γ 6 t:G and Γ 6 F .
Furthermore, M respects CS at each node. Indeed, by the construction of M, CS ⊆ Γ for each
Γ ∈ W . By the Truth Lemma, Γ c:A for each c:A ∈ CS.
The conclusion of the proof of Theorem 2 is standard. Let F be not derivable in JCS . Then the
set {¬F } is consistent. Using the standard saturation construction ([23; 48]), extend {¬F } to a
maximal consistent set Γ. By consistency, F 6∈ Γ. By the Truth Lemma, Γ 6 F .
2
There are several features of the canonical model which could be included into the formulation
of the Completeness Theorem to make it stronger.
Strong Evidence. We can show that the canonical model considered in this proof satisfies the
Strong Evidence property
Γ ∈ E(t, F ) implies Γ t:F.
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Indeed, let Γ ∈ E(t, F ). By the definition of E, t:F ∈ Γ, hence F ∈ Γ] and F ∈ ∆ for each ∆ such
that ΓR∆. By the Truth Lemma, ∆ F , hence Γ t:F . In a model with the Strong Evidence
property there are no void or irrelevant justifications; if t is an admissible evidence for F , then t is
a ‘real evidence’ for F , i.e., F holds at all possible worlds.
Fully Explanatory property for axiomatically appropriate Constant Specifications:
If ∆ F for all ∆ such that ΓR∆, then Γ t:F for some t.
Note that for axiomatically appropriate constant specifications CS, the Internalization property
holds: if G is provable in JCS , then t:G is also provable there for some term t. Here is the proof of
the Fully Explanatory property for canonical models3 . Suppose Γ 6 t:F for any justification term
t. Then the set Γ] ∪ {¬F } is consistent. Indeed, otherwise for some t1 :X1 , t2 :X2 , . . . , tn :Xn ∈ Γ,
X1 → (X2 → . . . → (Xn → F ) . . .) is provable. By Internalization, there is a justification s such that
s:(X1 → (X2 → . . . → (Xn → F ) . . .)) is also provable. By Application, t1 :X1 → (t2 :X2 → . . . → (tn :
Xn → (s·t1 ·t2 ·. . .·tn ):F ) . . .) is provable, hence Γ ` t:F for t = s · t1 · t2 · . . . · tn . Therefore, Γ t:F
— a contradiction. Let ∆ be a maximal consistent set extending Γ] ∪ {¬F }. By the definition of
R, ΓR∆, by the Truth Lemma, ∆ 6 F , which contradicts the assumptions.
Mkrtychev semantics is a predecessor of Kripke-Fitting semantics ([50]). Mrktychev models are
Kripke-Fitting models with a single world, and the proof of Theorem 2 can be easily modified to
establish completeness of JCS with respect to Mkrtychev models.
Theorem 3 For any Constant Specification CS, JCS is sound and complete for the class of Mrktychev models respecting CS.
Proof. Soundness follows immediately from Theorem 2. For completeness, define the canonical
model as in Theorem 2 except for R, which should be taken empty. This assumption makes the
condition ‘∆ F for all ∆ such that ΓR∆’ vacuously true, and the forcing condition for justification
assertions Γ t:F becomes equivalent to Γ ∈ E(t, F ), i.e., t:F ∈ Γ. This simplification immediately
verifies the Truth Lemma.
The conclusion of the proof of Theorem 3 is standard. Let F be not derivable in JCS . Then the
set {¬F } is consistent. Using the standard saturation construction, extend it to a maximal consistent set Γ containing ¬F . By consistency, F 6∈ Γ. By the Truth Lemma, Γ 6 F . The Mkrtychev
model consisting of this particular Γ is the desired counter-model for F . The rest of the canonical
model is irrelevant.
2
Note that Mkrtychev models built in Theorem 3 are not reflexive, and possess the Strong
Evidence property. On the other hand, Mkrtychev models cannot be Fully Explanatory, since
‘∆ F for all ∆ such that ΓR∆’ is vacuously true, but Γ t:F is not.
Theorem 3 shows that the information about Kripke structure in Kripke-Fitting models can
be completely encoded by the admissible evidence function. Mkrtychev models play an important
theoretical role in Justification Logic [7; 16; 40; 43; 49]. On the other hand, as we will see in
Section 10, Kripke-Fitting models can be useful as counter-models with desired properties since they
3

This proof for LP was offered by Fitting in [25].
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take into account both epistemic Kripke structure and evidence structure. Speaking metaphorically,
Kripke-Fitting models naturally reflect two reasons why a certain fact F can be unknown to an
agent: F fails at some possible world or an agent does not have a sufficient evidence of F .
Another application area of Kripke-Fitting style models is Justification Logic with both epistemic modalities and justification assertions (cf. [5; 12]).
Corollary 1 [Model existence] For any constant specification CS, JCS is consistent and has a
model.
Proof. JCS is consistent. Indeed, suppose JCS proves ⊥, and erase all justification terms (with ‘:’s)
in each of its formulas. What remains is a chain of propositional formulas provable in classical logic
(an easy induction on the length of the original proof) ending with ⊥ – contradiction.
To build a model for JCS , use the Completeness Theorem (Theorem 2). Since JCS does not
prove ⊥, by Completeness, there is a JCS -model (where ⊥ is false, of course).
2

6

Factivity

Unlike Application and Monotonicity, Factivity of justifications is not required in basic Justification
Logic systems, which makes the latter capable of representing both partial and factive justifications.
Factivity states that justifications of F are factive, i.e., sufficient for an agent to conclude that
F is true. This yields the Factivity Axiom
t:F → F,

(16)

which has a similar motivation to the Truth Axiom in epistemic modal logic
KF → F,

(17)

widely accepted as a basic property of knowledge (Plato, Wittgenstein, Hintikka, etc.).
The Factivity Axiom (16) first appeared in the Logic of Proofs LP as a principal feature of
mathematical proofs. Indeed, in this setting (16) is valid: if there is a mathematical proof t of F ,
then F must be true.
We adopt the Factivity Axiom (16) for justifications that lead to knowledge. However, factivity
alone does not warrant knowledge, which has been demonstrated by Gettier examples ([29]).
Logic of Factive Justifications:
JT0 = J0 + A4,
JT = J + A4,
with
A4. Factivity Axiom t:F → F .
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Systems JTCS corresponding to Constant Specifications CS are defined as in Section 3.4.
JT-models are J-models with reflexive accessibility relations R. The reflexivity condition makes
each possible world accessible from itself which exactly corresponds to the Factivity Axiom. The
direct analogue of Theorem 1 hold for JTCS as well.
Theorem 4 For any Constant Specification CS, each of the logics JTCS is sound and complete
with respect to the class of JT-models respecting CS.
Proof. We now proceed as in the proof of Theorem 2. The only addition to soundness is establishing
that the Factivity Axiom holds in reflexive models. Let R be reflexive. Suppose u t:F . Then
v F for all v such that uRv. By reflexivity of R, uRu, hence u F as well.
For completeness, it suffices to check that R in the canonical model is reflexive. Indeed, if
s:F ∈ Γ, then, by the properties of the maximal consistent sets, F ∈ Γ as well, since JT derives
s:F → F (with any CS). Hence Γ] ⊆ Γ and ΓRΓ.
2
Mkrtychev JT-models are singleton JT-models, i.e., JT-models with singleton W ’s.
Theorem 5 For any Constant Specification CS, each of the logics JTCS is sound and complete
with respect to the class of Mkrtychev JT-models respecting CS.
Proof. Soundness follows from Theorem 4. For completeness, we follow the footprints of Theorem
2, Theorem 3, but define the accessibility relation R as
ΓR∆ iff Γ = ∆.
2

6.1

Russell’s Example: Induced Factivity

Here is Russell’s well-known example from [60] of an epistemic scenario which can be meaningfully
analyzed in Justification Logic.
If a man believes that the late Prime Minister’s last name began with a ‘B,’ he believes
what is true, since the late Prime Minister was Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman4 . But
if he believes that Mr. Balfour was the late Prime Minister, he will still believe that the
late Prime Minister’s last name began with a ‘B,’ yet this belief, though true, would
not be thought to constitute knowledge.
As in the Red Barn Example (Section 4), we have to handle a wrong reason for a true justified
fact. Again, the tools at Justification Logic seem to be useful and adequate here.
Let B stand for
the late Prime Minister’s last name began with a ‘B.’
4

Which was common knowledge back in 1912.
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Furthermore, let w be a wrong reason for B and r the right (hence factive) reason for B. Then,
Russell’s example yields the following assumptions:
{w:B, r:B, r:B → B}.

(18)

In the original setting (18), we do not claim that w is a factive justification for B; moreover,
such factivity is not completely consistent with our intuition. Paradoxically, however, in the basic
Justification Logic J, we can logically deduce factivity of w from (18):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

r:B - an assumption;
r:B → B - an assumption;
B - from 1 and 2, by Modus Ponens;
B → (w:B → B) - a propositional axiom;
w:B → B - from 3 and 4, by Modus Ponens.

However, this derivation utilizes the fact that r is a factive justification for B to conclude w:B → B,
which constitutes the case of ‘induced factivity’ of w:B. The question is, how can we distinguish
the ‘real’ factivity of r:B from an ‘induced factivity’ of w:B? Again, some sort of truth-tracking
is needed here, and Justification Logic seems to do the job. The natural approach would be to
consider the set of assumptions (18) without r:B, i.e.,
{w:B, r:B → B},

(19)

and establish that factivity of w, i.e., w : B → B is not derivable from (19). Here is a J-model
M = (W, R, E, ) in which (19) holds but w:B → B does not.
W = {0}, R = ∅, 0 6 B, and E(t, F ) holds for all pairs (t, F ) except (r, B). It is easy to see
that the closure conditions Application and Sum on E are fulfilled. At 0, w:B holds, i.e.,
0 w:B,
since w is an admissible evidence for B at 0 and there are no possible worlds accessible from 0.
Furthermore,
0 6 r:B,
since, according to E, r is not an admissible evidence for B at 0. Hence
0 r:B → B.
On the other hand,
0 6 w:B → B
since B does not hold at 0.

7

Additional Principles and Systems

In this section, we discuss other principles and operations which may or may not be added to the
core Justification Logic systems.
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7.1

Positive Introspection

One of the common principles of knowledge is identifying knowing and knowing that one knows. In
the formal modal setting, this corresponds to
KF → KKF.
This principle has an adequate explicit counterpart: the fact that the agent accepts t as a sufficient
evidence of F serves as a sufficient evidence that t:F . Often, such meta-evidence has a physical
form, e.g., a referee report certifying that a proof of a paper is correct, a computer verification
output given a formal proof t of F as an input, a formal proof that t is a proof of F , etc. Positive
Introspection assumes that given t, the agent produces a justification !t of t:F such that
t:F → !t:(t:F ).
Positive Introspection in this operational form first appeared in the Logic of Proofs LP [2; 4].
We define
J4= J + A5
and
LP = JT + A5, 5
with
A5. Positive Introspection Axiom t:F → !t:(t:F ).
We also define J40 , J4CS , LP0 , and LPCS in the natural way (cf. Section 3.4). The direct analogue
of Theorem 1 holds for J4CS and LPCS as well.
Note that in the presence of the Positive Introspection Axiom, one could limit the scope of
the Axiom Internalization Rule R4 to internalizing axioms which are not yet of the form e : A.
This is how it has been done in LP: the Axiom Internalization can then be emulated by using
!!e:(!e:(e:A)) instead of e3 :(e2 :(e1 :A)), etc. The notion of Constant Specification could also be
simplified accordingly.
Such modifications are minor and they do not affect the main theorems and applications of
Justification Logic.

7.2

Negative Introspection

Pacuit and Rubtsova considered in [54; 55; 57; 58] the Negative Introspection operation ‘?’ which
verifies that a given justification assertion is false. A possible motivation for considering such an
operation could be that the positive introspection operation ‘!’ may well be regarded as capable of
providing conclusive verification judgments about the validity of justification assertions t:F . So,
when t is not a justification for F , such a ‘!’ should conclude that ¬t:F . This is normally the case
5

In our notation, LP can be assigned the name JT4. However, in virtue of a fundamental role played by LP for
Justification Logic, we suggest keeping the name LP for this system.
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for computer proof verifiers, proof checkers in formal theories, etc. This motivation is, however,
nuanced: the examples of proof verifiers and proof checkers work with both t and F as inputs,
whereas the Pacuit-Rubtsova format ?t suggests that the only input for ‘?’ is a justification t, and
the result ?t is supposed to justify propositions ¬t:F uniformly for all F ’s for which t:F does not
hold. Such an operation ‘?’ does not exist for formal mathematical proofs since ?t should be a single
proof of infinitely many propositions ¬t:F , which is impossible6 . For what it’s worth, we include
Negative Introspection in the list of additional justification principles, and leave the decision of
whether to accept it or not to the user.
A6. Negative Introspection Axiom ¬t:F → ?t:(¬t:F ).
We define systems
J45= J4 + A6,
JD45= J45 + ¬t:⊥,
JT45 = J45 + A4,
and naturally extend these definitions to J45CS , JD45CS , and JT45CS .
The direct analogue of Theorem 1 holds for J45CS , JD45CS , and JT45CS .

7.3

More Epistemic Models

We now define epistemic models for other Justification Logic systems.
• J4-models are J-models with transitive R and two additional conditions:
Monotonicity with respect to R, i.e., u ∈ E(t, F ) and uRv yield v ∈ E(t, F ),
Introspection closure: E(t, F ) ⊆ E(!t, t:F );
• LP-models are J4-models with reflexive R (these are the original Kripke-Fitting models);
• J45-models are J4-models satisfying conditions:
Negative Introspection closure: [E(t, F )]c ⊆ E(?t, ¬t:F ) (Here [X]c denotes the complement of
X.)
Strong Evidence: u t:F for all u ∈ E(t, F ) (i.e., only ‘actual’ evidence is admissible).
Note that J45-models satisfy the Stability property: uRv yields ‘u ∈ E(t, F ) iff v ∈ E(t, F ).’
In other words, E is monotone with respect to R−1 as well. Indeed, the direction ‘u ∈ E(t, F )
yields v ∈ E(t, F )’ is due to Monotonicity. Suppose u 6∈ E(t, F ). By Negative Introspection
closure, u ∈ E(?t, ¬t:F ). By Strong Evidence, u ?t:(¬t:F ). By the definition of forcing,
v ¬t:F , i.e., v 6 t:F . By Strong Evidence, v 6∈ E(t, F ).
6

A proof-compliant way to represent negative introspection in Justification Logic was suggested in [9], but we will
not consider it here.
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Note also that the Euclidean property of the accessibility relation R is not required for J45models and is not needed to establish the soundness of J45 with respect to J45-models.
However, the canonical model for J45 is Euclidean, hence both soundness and completeness
claims trivially survive an additional requirement that R is Euclidean.
• JD45-models are J45-models with the Serial condition on the accessibility relation R: for each
u there is v such that uRv holds.
• JT45-models are J45-models with reflexive R. Again, the Euclidean property (or, equivalently,
symmetry) of R is not needed for soundness. However, these properties hold for the canonical
JT45-model, hence they could be included into the formulation of the Completeness Theorem.
Theorem 6 Each of the logics J4CS , LPCS , J45CS , JT45CS for any Constant Specification is sound
and complete with respect to the corresponding class of epistemic models. JD45CS is complete w.r.t.
its epistemic models for axiomatically appropriate CS.
Proof. We will follow the footprints of the proof of Theorem 2.
1. J4. For soundness, it now suffices to check the validity of the Positive Introspection Axiom at
each node of any J4-model. Suppose u t:F . Then u ∈ E(t, F ) and v F for each v such that uRv.
By the closure condition, u ∈ E(!t, t:F ), and it remains to check that v t:F . By monotonicity of
E, v ∈ E(t, F ). Now, take any w such that vRw. By transitivity of R, uRw as well, hence w F .
Thus v t:F , u !t:t:F , and u t:F → !t:t:F .
Completeness is again established as in Theorem 2. It only remains to check that the accessibility
relation R is transitive, the admissible evidence function E is monotone, and the additional closure
condition on E holds.
Monotonicity. Suppose ΓR∆ and Γ ∈ E(t, F ), i.e., t:F ∈ Γ. By maximality of Γ, !t:t:F ∈ Γ as
well, since J4 ` t:F → !t:t:F . By definition, t:F ∈ ∆, i.e., ∆ ∈ E(t, F ).
Transitivity. Suppose ΓR∆, ∆RΣ, and t:F ∈ Γ. Then, by monotonicity, t:F ∈ ∆. By the
definition of R, F ∈ Σ, hence ΓRΣ.
Closure. Suppose Γ ∈ E(t, F ), i.e., t:F ∈ Γ. Then as above, !t:t:F ∈ Γ, hence Γ ∈ E(!t, t:F ).
2. LP. This is the well-studied case of the Logic of Proofs, cf. [25].
3. J45. Soundness. We have to check the Negative Introspection Axiom. Let u ¬t : F ,
i.e., u 6 t:F . By the Strong Evidence condition, u 6∈ E(t, F ). By Negative Introspection closure,
u ∈ E(?t, ¬t:F ). By Strong Evidence, u ?t:(¬t:F ).
Completeness. We follow the same canonical model construction as in J and J4. The only
addition is checking Negative Introspection closure. Let Γ 6∈ E(t, F ). Then t : F 6∈ Γ. By
maximality, ¬t:F ∈ Γ. By the Negative Introspection Axiom, ?t:(¬t:F ) ∈ Γ, hence Γ ∈ E(?t, ¬t:F ).
Here is an additional feature of the canonical model that can be included in the formulation of
the Completeness Theorem to make it more specific.
R is Euclidean. Let ΓR∆ and ΓR∆0 . It suffices to show that ∆] ⊆ ∆0 . Let F ∈ ∆] . Then for
some t, t:F ∈ ∆, i.e., ∆ ∈ E(t, F ). By Stability, Γ ∈ E(t, F ), hence t:F ∈ Γ and F ∈ Γ] . By the
definition of R, F ∈ ∆0 .
4. JD45. The proof can be found in [44].
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5. JT45. For soundness, it suffices to check the Factivity Axiom, which easily follows from the
reflexivity of R. For completeness, follow the footprints of 3 and note that R is reflexive. Indeed,
Γ] ⊆ Γ for reflexive theories.
The additional features of the canonical model are as follows: R is an equivalence relation, the
admissible evidence function does not distinguish equivalent worlds. This follows easily from 5. 2
Historical survey. The first Justification Logic system LP was introduced in 1995 in [2] (cf.
also [4]). Such basic properties of Justification Logic as internalization, realization, arithmetical semantics [2; 4], symbolic models and complexity estimates ([16; 43; 49; 50]), and epistemic semantics
and completeness [24; 25] were first established for LP.
A fair amount of work has already been done on Jusification Logics other than LP. Systems J,
J4, and JT were first considered in [15] under different names and in a slightly different setting7 .
JT45 appeared independently in [54; 55] and [57; 58], and JD45 in [54; 55]. J45 has, perhaps,
first been considered in this work. Systems combining epistemic modalities and justifications were
studied in [5; 11; 12].
Mkrtychev semantics for J, JT, and J4 with Completeness Theorem were found in [43]. Complexity bounds for LP and J4 were found in [43; 49]. A comprehensive overview of all decidability
and complexity results can be found in [44].

8

Forgetful Projection and the Correspondence Theorem

An intuitive connection between justification assertions and the justified belief modality 2 involves
the informal existential quantifier: 2F is read as
for some x, x:F .
The language of Justification Logic does not have quantifiers over justifications, but instead has
a sufficiently rich system of operations (polynomials) on justifications. We can use Skolem’s idea
of replacing quantifiers by functions and view Justification Logic systems as Skolemized logics
of knowledge/belief. Naturally, to convert a Justification Logic sentence to the corresponding
Epistemic Modal Logic sentence, one can use the forgetful projection ‘;’ that replaces each
occurrence of t:F by 2F .
Example: the sentence
x:P → f (x):Q
can be regarded as a Skolem-style version of
∃x(x:P ) → ∃y(y:Q),
which can be read as
2P → 2Q,
7

[15] also considered variants of Justification Logic systems which, in our notations, would be called “JD” and
“JD4.”
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which is the forgetful projection of the original sentence x:P → f (x):Q (here, P , Q are assumed to
be atomic sentences for simplicity’s sake).
Examples (P , Q are atomic propositions):
t:P → P

;

2P → P,

t:P → !t:(t:P )

;

2P → 22P,

s:(P → Q) → (t:P → (s·t):Q)

;

2(P → Q) → (2P → 2Q).

Forgetful projection sometimes forgets too much, e.g., a logical triviality x:P → x:P , a meaningful
principle x:P → (x+y):P , and a non-valid formula x:P → y:P have the same forgetful projection 2P →
2P . However, ‘;’ always maps valid formulas of Justification Logic to valid formulas of Epistemic
Logic. The converse also holds: any valid formula of Epistemic Logic is a forgetful projection
of some valid formula of Justification Logic. This follows from Correspondence Theorem 7. We
assume that ‘;’ is naturally extended from sentences to logics.
Theorem 7 [Consolidated Correspondence Theorem]
1. J ; K
2. JT ; T
3. J4 ; K4
4. LP ; S4
5. J45 ; K45
6. JD45 ; KD45
7. JT45 ; S5
Proof. It is straightforward that the forgetful projection of each of the Justification Logic systems
J, JT, J4, LP, J45, JD45, JT45 is derivable in the corresponding epistemic modal logics K, T, K4,
S4, K45, KD45, S5, respectively.
The core of Theorem 7 is the Realization Theorem:
One can recover justification terms for all modal operators in valid principles of epistemic modal logics K, T, K4, S4, K45, KD45, and S5 such that the resulting formula is
derivable in the corresponding Justification Logic system J, JT, J4, LP, J45, JD45, and
JT45.
The important feature of the Realization Theorem is that it recovers realizing functions according to
the existential reading of the modality, i.e., negative occurrences of the modality are realized
by (distinct) free variables, and the positive occurrences by justification polynomials, depending
on these variables. For example, 2F → 2G will be realized by x:F 0 → f (x):G0 where F 0 , G0 are
realizations of F and G, respectively.
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The Realization Theorem was first established for S4/LP (case 4) in [2; 4], cases 1–3 are covered
in [15]. The Realization Theorem for 7 is established in [58] using a very potent method from [25],
and the proof for 5 and 6 is very similar to [25; 58] and can be safely omitted here.
2
The Correspondence Theorem shows that the major epistemic modal logics K, K4, K45, KD45
(for belief) and T, S4, S5 (for knowledge) have exact Justification Logic counterparts J, J4, J45,
JD45 (for partial justifications) and JT, LP, JT45 (for factive justifications).

8.1

Foundational Consequences of the Correspondence Theorem

Is there anything new that we have learned from the Correspondence Theorem about epistemic
modal logics?
First of all, this theorem provides a new semantics for major modal logics. In addition to the
traditional Kripke-style ‘universal’ reading of 2F as
F holds in all possible situations,
there is now a rigorous ‘existential’ semantics for 2F that reads as
there is a witness (proof, justification) for F.
Perhaps the justification semantics plays a similar role in modal logic to that played by Kleene
realizability in intuitionistic logic. In both cases, the intended semantics was existential: the
Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of intuitionistic logic ([36; 65; 66]) and Gödel’s provability reading of S4 ([30; 31]). In both cases, a later possible-world semantics of universal character became a highly potent and dominant technical tool. However, in both cases, Kripke semantics
did not solve the original semantical problems. It took Kleene realizability [39; 63] to reveal the
computational semantics of intuitionistic logic and the Logic of Proofs [2; 4] to provide exact BHK
semantics of proofs for intuitionistic and modal logic.
In the epistemic context, Justification Logic and the Correspondence Theorem add a new ‘justification’ component to modal logics of knowledge and belief. Again, this new component was
in fact an old and central notion which has been widely discussed by mainstream epistemologists
but has remained out of the scope of formal logical methods. The Correspondence Theorem tells
us that justifications are compatible with Hintikka-style systems and hence can be regarded as a
foundation for epistemic modal logic.
Another comparison suggests itself here: Skolem functions for first-order logic which provide
a functional reading of quantifiers. It might seem that Skolem functions do not add much, since
they do not suggest altering first-order logic. However, Skolem functions proved to be very useful
for foundations (e.g., Henkin and Herbrand models, etc.), as well as for applications (Resolution,
Logic Programming, etc.).
Note that the Realization Theorem is not at all trivial. For cases 1–4, realization algorithms
are known that use cut-free derivations in the corresponding modal logics [2; 4; 15; 16]. For 5–7,
the Realization Theorem has been established by Fitting’s method or its proper modifications [25;
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58]. In principle, these results also produce realization procedures which are based on exhaustive
search.
It would be a mistake to draw the conclusion that any modal logic has a reasonable Justification
Logic counterpart. For example, the logic of formal provability GL ([8; 14]) contains the Löb
Principle
2(2F → F ) → 2F,
(20)
which does not seem to have an epistemically acceptable explicit version. Let us consider, for
example, a case when F is the propositional constant ⊥ for false. A Skolem-style reading of (20)
suggests that there are justification terms s and t such that
x:(s:⊥ → ⊥) → t:⊥.

(21)

This is intuitively false for factive justification, though. Indeed, s:⊥ → ⊥ is the Factivity Axiom.
Apply Axiom Internalization R4 to obtain c:[s:⊥ → ⊥] for some constant c. This choice of c makes
the antecedent of (21) intuitively true and the conclusion of (21) false8 . In particular, (20) is not
valid for proof interpretation (cf. [33] for a total account of which principles of GL are realizable).

9

Quantifier-Free First-Order Justification Logic

In this section, we extend J from the propositional language to the quantifier-free first-order language. To simplify formalities, we will regard here the first-order language without functional
symbols, but with equality. Later, in Section 10, we will introduce definite descriptions in the form
ιxF (x).
The language under consideration in this section is the first-order predicate language with
individual variables and constants, predicate symbols of any arity and the equality symbol ‘=,’
along with justification terms (including operations ‘·’ and ‘+’) and the formula formation symbol
‘:’ as in Section 3.3. Formulas are defined in the usual first-order way (without quantifiers) with
an additional clause that if F is a formula and t is a justification polynomial, then t:F is again a
formula. The ‘quantifier-free J’ has all the axioms and rules of J, plus the equality axioms.
The formal system qfJ0 has the following postulates:
A1. Classical axioms of quantifier-free first-order logic with equality and Modus Ponens,
A2. Application Axiom s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s · t):G),
A3. Monotonicity Axiom s:F → (s + t):F , s:F → (t + s):F ,
E1. g = g for any individual term g (reflexivity of equality);
E2. f = g → (P [f /x] → P [g/x]) (substitutivity of equality), where f and g are individual terms, P
is any atomic formula, P [f /x] and P [g/x] are the results of replacing all the occurrences of a
variable x in P by f and g respectively; we will use notations P (f ), P (g) for that.
8

To be precise, we have to substitute c for x everywhere in s and t.
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The system qfJ is qfJ0 + R4, where
R4.

For each axiom A and any constants e1 , e2 , . . . , en , infer en : en−1 : . . . : e1 : A.

As in Section 3.4, we define Constant Specifications and systems qfJCS . In particular, qfJ∅ is qfJ0
and qfJTCS is qfJ.
The following proposition follows easily from the definitions.
Proposition 1 Deduction Theorem holds for qfJCS for any constant specification CS. Internalization holds for qfJCS for an axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS.
The following theorem provides a way to resolve the Frege puzzle ([28]) in an epistemic environment:
equality of individual objects alone does not warrant substitutivity, but justified equality does.
Theorem 8 [Justified substitution] For any individual terms f and g, justification variable u, and
atomic formula P (x), there is a justification term s(u) such that qfJ proves
u:(f = g) → s(u):[P (f ) ↔ P (g)].
The same holds for any qfJCS with an axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS.
Proof. Taking into account Example 1, it suffices to establish that for some t(u),
u:(f = g) → t(u):[P (f ) → P (g)].
From E2 it follows that qfJ proves
(f = g) → [P (f ) → P (g)].
By R4, there is a justification constant c such that qfJ proves
c:{(f = g) → [P (f ) → P (g)]}.
By A2, qfJ proves
c:{(f = g) → [P (f ) → P (g)]} → {u:(f = g) → (c·u):[P (f ) → P (g)]}.
By Modus Ponens, qfJ proves
u:(f = g) → (c·u):[P (f ) → P (g)].
2

It suffices now to pick c·u as t(u).

An unjustified substitution can fail in qfJ. Namely, for any individual variables x and y, a
predicate symbol P , and justification term s, the formula
(x = y) → s:[P (x) ↔ P (y)]

(22)

is not valid. To establish this, one needs some model theory for qfJ.
We define qfJ-models as the usual first-order Kripke models9 equipped with admissible evidence
functions. A model is (W, {Dw }, R, E, ) such that the following properties hold.
9

Equality is interpreted as identity in the model.
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• W is an nonempty set of worlds.
• {Dw } is the collection of nonempty domains Dw for each w ∈ W .
• R is the binary (accessibility) relation on W .
• E is the admissible evidence function which for each justification term t and formula F ,
returns the set of worlds E(t, F ) ⊆ W . Informally, these are the worlds where t is admissible
evidence for F . We also assume that E satisfies the usual closure properties Application and
Sum (Section 5).
•

is the forcing (truth) relation such that
assigns elements of Dw to individual variables and constants for each w ∈ W ,
for each n-ary predicate symbol P , and any a1 , a2 , . . . , an ∈ Dw , it is specified whether
P (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) holds in Dw ,
is extended to all the formulas by stipulating that
w s = t iff ‘

’ maps s and t to the same element of Dw ,

w P (t1 , t2 , . . . , tn ) iff ‘

’ maps ti ’s to ai ’s and P (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) holds in Dw ,

w F ∧ G iff w F and w G,
w ¬F iff w 6 F ,
w t:F iff v F for all v such that wRv, and w ∈ E(t, F ).
The notion of a model respecting given constant specification is directly transfered from Section 5.
The following Theorem is established in the same manner as the soundness part of Theorem 2.
Theorem 9 For any Constant Specification CS, qfJCS is sound with respect to the corresponding
class of epistemic models.
We are now ready to show that instances of unjustified substitution can fail in qfJ. To do this, it
now suffices to build a qfJ-counter-model for (22) with the total constant specification. Obviously,
the maximal E (i.e., E(t, F ) contains each world for any t and F ) respects any constant specification.
The Kripke-Fitting counter-model in Figure 1 exploits the traditional modal approach to refute
a belief assertion by presenting a possible world where the object of this belief does not hold. In
the picture, only true atomic formulas are shown next to possible worlds.
• W = {0, 1}; R = {(0, 1)}; D0 = D1 = {a, b};
• 1 P (a) and 1 6 P (b); the truth value of P at 0 does not matter;
• x and y are interpreted as a at 0; x is interpreted as a and y as b at 1;
• E is maximal at 0 and 1.
Obviously, 0
Hence

x = y. Since 1 6 P (x) ↔ P (y), for any justification term s, 0 6 s:[P (x) ↔ P (y)].
0 6 x = y → s:[P (x) ↔ P (y)].
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maximal E

1
•O P (a)

maximal E

•
0

Figure 1: Fitting counter-model for unjustified substitution

10

Formalization of Gettier Examples

We consider Gettier’s Case I in detail; Case II is much simpler logically and can be given similar
treatment. We will present a complete formalization of Case I in qfJ with a definite description
operation. Let
• J(x) be the predicate x gets the job;
• C(x) be the predicate x has (ten) coins (in his pocket);
• Jones and Smith be individual constants denoting Jones and Smith, respectively10 ;
• u be a justification variable.

10.1

Natural Model for Case I

Gettier’s assumptions (d) and (e) contain a definite description
the man who will get the job.

(23)

In this section, we will formalize Case I using a definite description ι-operation such that ιxP (x) is
intended to denote
the x such that P (x).
We interpret ιxP (x) in a given world of a qfJ-model as the element a such that P (a) if there exists
a unique a satisfying P (a). Otherwise, ιxP (x) is undefined and any atomic formula where ιxP (x)
actually occurs is taken to be false. Definite description terms are non-rigid designators: ιxP (x)
may be given different interpretations in different worlds of the same qfJ-model (cf. [26]). The use
of a definite description
Jones is the man who will get the job
as a justified belief by Smith hints that Smith has strong evidence for the fact that at most one
person will get the job. This is implicit in Gettier’s assumption.
We now present a Fitting model M which may be regarded as an exact epistemic formulation
of Case I.
10

Assuming that there are people seeking the job other than Jones and Smith does not change the analysis.
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1. At the actual world 0, J(Smith), C(Smith), and C(Jones)11 hold and J(Jones) does not
hold.
2. There is a possible belief world 1 for Smith at which J(Jones) and ¬J(Smith) hold. These
conditions follow from proposition (d)
Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has coins
or, in logic form,
(Jones = ιxJ(x)) ∧ C(Jones)
for which Smith has a strong evidence. In addition, Smith has no knowledge of ‘Smith has
coins’ and there should be a possible world at which C(Smith) is false; we use 1 to represent
this possibility.
3. World 1 is accessible from 0.
4. Smith has a strong evidence of (d), which we will represent by introducing a justification
variable u such that
u:[(Jones = ιxJ(x)) ∧ C(Jones)]
(24)
holds at the actual world 0. We further assume that the admissible evidence function E
respects the justification assertion (24), which yields
0 ∈ E(u, (Jones = ιxJ(x)) ∧ C(Jones)).
To keep things simple, we can assume that E is the maximal admissible evidence function,
i.e., E(t, F ) = {0, 1} for each t, F .
These observations lead to the following model M on Figure 2.
1
maximal E •O J(Jones), C(Jones)

maximal E • J(Smith), C(Jones), C(Smith)
0
Figure 2: Natural Fitting model for Gettier Case I
11

Strictly speaking, Case I explicitly states only that Smith has a strong evidence that C(Jones), which is not
sufficient to conclude that C(Jones), since Smith’s justifications are not necessarily factive. However, since the actual
truth value of C(Jones) does not matter in Case I, we assume that in this instance, Smith’s belief that C(Jones) was
true.
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• W = {0, 1};

R = {(0, 1)};

• D0,1 = {Jones, Smith}, Jones is interpreted as ‘Jones’ and Smith as ‘Smith’;
• 0 J(Smith), C(Jones), C(Smith), ¬J(Jones);
• 1 J(Jones), C(Jones), ¬J(Smith), ¬C(Smith);
• ιxJ(x) at 0 is interpreted as Smith and at 1 as Jones;
• E is maximal at both 0 and 1.
It is interesting to compare this model with the axiomatic description of Case I. Here is the list
of explicit assumptions:
J(Smith), C(Smith), C(Jones), ¬J(Jones), u:[(Jones = ιxJ(x)) ∧ C(Jones)].

(25)

It follows from the Soundness Theorem 9 that assumptions (25) provide a sound description of the
actual world:
Proposition 2 qfJ + (25) ` F entails 0 F .
Example 3 The description of a model by (25) is not complete. For example, conditions (25) do
not specifically indicate whether t:C(Smith) holds at the actual world for some t, whereas it is
clear from the model that 0 6 t:C(Smith) for any t since 1 6 C(Smith) and 1 is accessible from 0.
Model M extends the set of assumptions (25) to a possible complete specification: every ground
proposition F in the language of this example is either true or false at the ‘actual’ world 0 of the
model.

10.2

Formalizing Gettier’s Reasoning

Gettier’s conclusion in Case I states that Smith is justified in believing that ‘The man who will get
the job has ten coins in his pocket.’ In our formal language, this amounts to a statement that for
some justification term t,
t:C(ιxJ(x))
(26)
is derivable in qfJ from assumptions of Case I.
Theorem 10 Gettier’s conclusion t:C(ιxJ(x)) is derivable in qfJ from assumptions (25) of Case
I. Furthermore, t:C(ιxJ(x)) holds at the ‘actual world’ 0 of the natural model M of Case I.
Proof. In order to find t we may mimic Gettier’s informal reasoning. First, we formally derive
(e) (i.e., C(ιxJ(x))) from (d) (i.e., Jones = ιxJ(x) ∧ C(Jones)) and then use the fact that (d)
is justified (i.e., u:[Jones = ιxJ(x) ∧ C(Jones)]). We will now show that this argument can be
formalized in qfJ. Note that in qfJ, we may reason as follows:
1. Jones = ιxJ(x) → [C(Jones) → C(ιxJ(x))], an axiom of qfJ;
2. [Jones = ιxJ(x) ∧ C(Jones)] → C(ιxJ(x)), by propositional reasoning, from 1;
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3. s:{[Jones = ιxJ(x) ∧ C(Jones)] → C(ιxJ(x))}, by Internalization, from 2;
4. u:[Jones = ιxJ(x) ∧ C(Jones)] → (s·u):C(ιxJ(x)), by Axiom A2 and Modus Ponens, from 3;
5. u:[Jones = ιxJ(x) ∧ C(Jones)], an assumption from (25);
6. (s·u):C(ιxJ(x)), by Modus Ponens, from 4 and 5.
Now we can pick t to be s·u. So,
qfJ + (25) ` (s·u):C(ιxJ(x))
and, by Proposition 2,
0 (s·u):C(ιxJ(x)).
2

10.3

Eliminating Definite Descriptions, Russell-style

We can eliminate definite descriptions from Case I using, e.g., Russell’s translation (cf. [27; 52;
59; 61]) of definite descriptions. According to Russell, C(ιxJ(x)) contains a hidden uniqueness
assumption and reads as
∃x[J(x) ∧ ∀y(J(y) → y = x) ∧ C(x)],
(27)
and Jones = ιxJ(x) as
J(Jones) ∧ ∀y(J(y) → y = Jones).

(28)

In addition, in the universe of Case I consisting of two objects Jones, Smith, a universally quantified
sentence ∀yF (y) reads as
F (Jones) ∧ F (Smith),
and an existentially quantified statement ∃xG(x) reads as
G(Jones) ∨ G(Smith).
Taking into account all of these simplifying observations, we may assume that for Smith (and the
reader), ∀y(J(y) → y = Jones) reads as
[J(Jones) → (Jones = Jones)] ∧ [J(Smith) → (Smith = Jones)],
which is equivalent12 to
¬J(Smith).
Now, (28) is equivalent to
J(Jones) ∧ ¬J(Smith),
and the whole Gettier proposition (d) collapses to
J(Jones) ∧ ¬J(Smith) ∧ C(Jones).
12

We assume that everybody is aware that Smith 6= Jones.

32

(29)

The assumption that (d) is justified for Smith can now be represented by
v:[J(Jones) ∧ ¬J(Smith) ∧ C(Jones)],

(30)

for some justification variable v.
Smith’s justified belief
‘the man who will get the job has coins,’

(31)

according to Russell, should read as
∃x[J(x) ∧ ∀y(J(y) → y = x) ∧ C(x)].

(32)

The same considerations as above show that
∀y[J(y) → (y = Jones)]
is equivalent to
¬J(Smith),
and
∀y[J(y) → (y = Smith)]
is equivalent to
¬J(Jones).
Since an existentially quantified formula ∃xG(x) is logically equivalent to a disjunction G(Jones) ∨
G(Smith), formula (32) is equivalent to
[J(Jones) ∧ ¬J(Smith) ∧ C(Jones)] ∨ [J(Smith) ∧ ¬J(Jones) ∧ C(Smith)].

(33)

Finally, the formalization of (31) in our language amounts to stating that for some justification
term p,
p:{[J(Jones) ∧ ¬J(Smith) ∧ C(Jones)] ∨ [J(Smith) ∧ ¬J(Jones) ∧ C(Smith)]}.

(34)

Theorem 11 Gettier’s claim (34) is derivable in qfJ from the assumption (30) of Case I, and
holds in the ‘actual world’ 0 of the natural model M of Case I.
Proof. After all the preliminary work and assumptions, there is not much left to do. We just note
that (29) is a disjunct of (33). A derivation of (34) from (30) in qfJ reduces now to repeating steps
of Example 2, which shows how to derive a justified disjunction from its justified disjunct.
2
Comment 1 One can see clearly the essence of Gettier’s example. In (33), one of two disjuncts
is justified but false, whereas the other disjunct is unjustified but true. The resulting disjunction
(33) is both justified and true, but not really known to Smith.
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10.4

Hidden Uniqueness Assumption is Necessary

In this subsection, we study what happens if we deviate from Russell’s reading of definite descriptions, in particular if we skip the uniqueness of the defined object. For example, let us read Gettier’s
proposition (d) as
Jones will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket,

(35)

and proposition (e) as
A man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

(36)

Then a fair formalization of (35) would be
J(Jones) ∧ C(Jones),

(37)

and the assumption that (35) is justified for Smith is formalized as
u:[J(Jones) ∧ C(Jones)].

(38)

In this case, the set of explicitly made non-logical assumptions is
1. u:[J(Jones)∧C(Jones)], assumption (38);
2. ¬J(Jones) (Jones does not get the job);
3. J(Smith) (Smith gets the job);
4. C(Smith) (Smith has coins).
Condition (36) naturally formalizes as
[J(Jones) → C(Jones)] ∧ [J(Smith) → C(Smith)].

(39)

The claim that (39) is justified for Smith is formalized as
t:{[J(Jones) → C(Jones)] ∧ [J(Smith) → C(Smith)]}

(40)

for some justification term t.
We show that the assumptions 1–4 above do not suffice for proving (40).
Proposition 3 For any justification term t, formula (40) is not derivable in qfJ from assumptions
1–4.
Proof. Suppose (40) is derivable in qfJ from assumptions 1–4. Then, by the Deduction Theorem,
qfJ would derive
‘Conjunction of 1–4 ’ → (40).
(41)
It now suffices to build a Fitting qfJ-model (Figure 3) where (41) does not hold at a certain world.
At 0, all assumptions 1–4 hold, but (40) is false at 0 for all t’s. Indeed, (39) is false at 1, since its
conjunct
J(Smith) → C(Smith)
2

is false at 1, and 1 is accessible from 0.
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maximal E

1
•O J(Smith), J(Jones), C(Jones)

maximal E

• J(Smith), C(Jones), C(Smith)
0

Figure 3: Counter-model for Case I without uniqueness

10.5

Streamlined Case I: No Coins/Pockets Are Needed

In this subsection, we show that references to coins and pockets, as well as definite descriptions,
are redundant for making the point in Gettier example Case I. Here is a simpler, streamlined case
based on the same material.
Smith has strong evidence for the proposition:
(d) Jones will get the job.
Proposition (d) entails:
(e) Either Jones or Smith will get the job.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of
(d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is
true. But imagine further that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. Then
1) (e) is true,
2) Smith believes that (e) is true, and
3) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true.
But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true. . ..
In this version, the main assumption is
Smith has a strong evidence that Jones gets the job.

(42)

Its straightforward formalization is
v:J(Jones).

(43)

Smith is justified in believing that either Jones or Smith will get the job.

(44)

The claim is that

The natural formalization of the claim
t:[J(Jones) ∨ J(Smith)].
The set of formal assumptions is
v:J(Jones), J(Smith), ¬J(Jones).
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(45)

It is easy now to derive (45) in qfJ from assumption (43).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

v:J(Jones), assumption (43);
J(Jones) → J(Jones)∨J(Smith), propositional axiom;
c:[J(Jones) → J(Jones)∨J(Smith)], from 2, by Axiom Internalization R4;
c:[J(Jones) → J(Jones)∨J(Smith)] → [v:J(Jones) → (c·v):(J(Jones)∨J(Smith))], Axiom A2;
(c·v):[J(Jones)∨J(Smith)], from 4, 3, and 1, by Modus Ponens twice.

maximal E

1
•O J(Jones)

maximal E

• J(Smith)
0

Figure 4: Natural Fitting model for the streamlined Case I
At the actual world 0, both hold:
J(Jones)∨J(Smith) (meaning (e) is true)
and
(c·v):[J(Jones)∨J(Smith)] (meaning (e) is justified).
The desired Gettier-style point is made on the same material but without the unnecessary use of
quantifiers, definite descriptions, coins, and pockets.
It is fair to note, however, that Gettier example Case II in [29] does not have these kinds of
redundancies and is logically similar to the streamlined version of Case I presented above.

11

Gettier Example and Factivity

Theorem 12 Gettier assumptions (25) in Case I are inconsistent in Justification Logic systems
with factive justifications.
Proof. Here is an obvious derivation of a contradiction in qfJT from (25):
u:[(Jones = ιxJ(x)) ∧ C(Jones)], by (24);
Jones = ιxJ(x), by the Factivity Axiom and some propositional logic;
(Jones = ιxJ(x)) → J(Jones), an assumed natural property of definite descriptions;
J(Jones), by Modus Ponens. This contradicts the condition ¬J(Jones) from (25).
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2

The question is, what we have learned about Justification, Belief, Knowledge, and other epistemic matters?
Within the domain of formal epistemology, we now have a basic logic machinery to study
justifications and their connections with Belief and Knowledge. Formalizing Gettier is a case study
that demonstrates the method.
We show that Gettier reasoning was formally correct, with some hidden assumptions related
to definite descriptions. Gettier examples belong to the area of Justification Logic dealing with
partial justifications and are inconsistent within Justification Logic systems of factive justifications
and knowledge. All this, perhaps, does not come as a surprise to epistemologists. However, these
observations show that models provided by Justification Logic behave in a reasonable manner.
For epistemology, these developments are furthering the study of justification, e.g., the search
for the ‘fourth condition’ of the JTB definition of knowledge. Justification Logic provides systematic examples of epistemological principles such as Application, Monotonicity, Logical Awareness,
and their combinations, which look plausible, at least, within the propositional domain. Further
discussion on these and other Justification Logic principles could be an interesting contribution to
this area.

12

Conclusions

Justification Logic extends the logic of knowledge by the formal theory of justification. Justification Logic has roots in mainstream epistemology, mathematical logic, computer science, and
artificial intelligence. It is capable of formalizing a significant portion of reasoning about justifications. In particular, we have seen how to formalize Kripke, Russell, and Gettier examples in
Justification Logic. This formalization has been used for the resolution of paradoxes, verification,
hidden assumption analysis, and eliminating redundancies.
Among other known applications of Justification Logic, so far there are
• intended provability semantics for Gödel’s provability logic S4 with the Completeness Theorem
([2; 4]);
• formalization of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic
with the Completeness Theorem ([2; 4]);
• a general definition of the Logical Omniscience property, rigorous theorems that evidence
assertions in Justification Logic are not logically omniscient ([10]). This provides a general
framework for treating the problem of logical omniscience;
• an evidence-based approach to Common Knowledge (so-called Justified Common Knowledge)
which provides a rigorous semantics to McCarthy’s ‘any fool knows’ systems ([1; 5; 47]).
Justified Common Knowledge offers formal systems which are less restrictive than the usual
epistemic logics with Common Knowledge [5].
• analysis of Knower and Knowability paradoxes ([17; 18]).
37

It remains to be seen to what extent Justification Logic can be useful for analysis of empirical,
perceptual, and a priori types of knowledge. From the perspective of Justification Logic, such
knowledge may be considered as justified by constants (i.e., atomic justifications). Apparently,
further discussion is needed here.
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